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Chapter 10

Limited by Law?
Gender, Corporate Law, and the Family Firm

Mary Condon

Introduction
The business ent erprise is central to the operation of the Canad ian capitalist
economy in that it is a vehicle for the accumulation of profit, as well as a signif·
icant social location of employment. It is therefore one of the key mechanisms
through whi ch inter-class rel ations are mediated. A nu m ber of feminist scholars have pointed out that those class relations cannot be understood i n isolation from gender relations. As Folbre and Hartmann (1988: 192) note
disparagingly, 'the rhetoric of class interest simply subsumes the possibility of
gender interests .' In their historical study of the English middle class between
1780 and 1850, Davidoff and Hall (1987: 13) begin their analysis fron1 the
proposition that 'gender and class always operate together'. The development,
and claim to moral superiority, of th e middle class in the period they studied
'was articulated within a gendered concept of class. Middle-class gentlemen
and middle-class ladies each had their appointed place in this newly mapped
social world.' Indeed, they argue that gender played a strategic role in the
development of the middle class in that 'A heavily gendered view of the world
was utilized to soften, if not disavov,1, the disruption of a growing class system
as the master and household head was transmuted into employer on the one
hand and husband/fa ther on the other:
In the contemporary period, the intersection between gender and class has
been examined by feminist scholars in the context of women as workers
(Fudge, 1991), but less in the intra-class context of women within the ownership class. One significant aspect of an examination of the potentially gendered
nature of business ownership \vould be the extent to which women's role in,
and membersh ip of, that class is mediated by their position within the family
(Zeitlin, 1989; Davidoff and Hall, 1987}. As Folbre and Hartmann (1988: 191}
point out, in the context of working-class women, 'members of families are
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assumed to have the same class membership and class interests as their male
wage earner.' Yet women who do n ot have access to a wage themselves are
dependent on a wage-earner, or are possibly more dependent on state benefits.
Women who do work for a wage maystill be expected to assume greater
responsibility for family well-being. This latter point may still hold true even if
women are themselves property or business owners (Belcourt, 1991: 67). One
important social location where the intersection of class, gender, and family
relationships can be observed is the family business,1 in which women may
have the opportunity not just to be workers in the enterprise but also to be
owners or managers. Indeed, the family business is a location where analyti·
cally distinct class positions, of owner on the one hand and worker on the
other, become blurred. Further, investigation of the role of women in family
businesses may provide insight into the manner in which two spheres of liberalism's 'private' realm-the business enterprise and the family-intersect
(Boyd, 1997; Davidoff and Hall, 1987) .
If the question of whether and how women's participation in family
businesses is 'gendered' has been neglected by femi nist researchers, even less
an object of attention has been the contemporary significance of legal rules in
the constitution and maintenance of that gendered family business enterprise.
This chapter seeks to make a contribution to that assessment. In accordance
with the theme of this collection, law will be examined as a 'gendering strategy', that is, a process that produces gender identities and 'insists on a specific
version of gender differentiation' (Smart, 1992: 34). An attempt will be made
to assess the continuing importance of the rules of corporate law in maintaining gendered identities and opportunities for women in family businesses.
Historically, of course, as Davidoff and Hall (1987: 275-89) demonstrate, law
played a largely restrictive role in that women were limited in the forms of
property they could legally hold and what they could do with that property. It
is useful to ask whether corporate law now plays a more facilitative role for
women. Does it constitute dif ferences between the roles of women business
owners and those of their male counterparts? Are t he 'subjects' of corporate
law gendered?
It should be emphasized that the examination of corporate law from a
feminist perspective is in its infancy. Such work as has been done has by and
large focused on a prelimin ary demonstration that the fundamental premises of
corporate law, though ostensibly gender-neutral, in fact are permeated with
gendered understanding s and discourses (Lahey and Salter, 1985; Bauman,
19.91). This fe1ninist rereading of corporate law can usef ully be linked to a
recent and broader feminist project of critiquing the premises of economics
(Nelson, 1996; Folbre and Hartma nn, 1988; Ferber and Nelson, 1993;
McCluskey, 1996), since the economic perspective on law is one of the 1nore
end uring, and contested, intellectual perspectives on law in the North
American context (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Cheffins, 1997; Trebilcock,
1991; Williams, 1991). The first task of this chapter, therefore, is to outline
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some of the key premises of corporate law, along with the critique from
feminists about their gendered underpinnings. The purpose of doing this is to
demonstrate how the doctrines of corporate law may operate at a symbolic
level to constitute gendered understandings of the appropriate structure and
operation of business enterprises.
However. this chapter is in part a plea to move to the second stage of
feminist engagement with corporate law. This is to specif y. using the admittedly limited sources of empirical information that currently exist, the actual
influence of corporate Jaw in structuring gendered business practices and
producing gendered material effects for wom en within firms, recognizing the
variation in types of corporate enterprises. It will be argued that in th e specific
context of the family firm, there is a need to be sensitive to other constitutive
practices that may be at work in this domain . Thus, care must b taken in
attributing primacy to the speci fic role of corporate law in the gendering of
family business enterprises.

Corporate Law, Economics, and Gender
Business enterprises can be operated through a variety of legal forms, such as
sole proprietorships, partnerships, co-operatives, joint ventures, and corporations.2 These different legal frameworks for doing business allocate the risks,
responsibilities, and benefits of enterprise in a variety of ways. One im plication
of this is that these dif ferent legal forms may create different legal resources,
opportttnities, and restrictions for the mediation of class or gender relations in
the context of the business enterprise. One legally authored form of enterprise,
the corporation, is popularly regarded as the most pervasive mechanism for
doing business, despite the fact that in Canada.• as in other jurisdictions, many
small enterprlses are not actually incorporated (Freedman, 1994) . Corporate
law is best understood as a set of rules governing the structure and organization of a business entity and as a device for allocating responsibilities for action
\vithin the organization. From the la'v and economics perspective, the purpose
of corporate law is to allow a business or firm to function in the interests of
efficiency. From this perspective, corporate Jaw provisions are a cheaper alternative to an individual market-based negotiation of terms on which to invest,
work, manage, supply raw materials or resources, and so on. As Easterbrook
and Fischel (1991: 34) put it, 'corporate law fills in the blanks and oversights
with the terms that people would have bargained for had they anticipated the
problems and been able to transact costlessly in advance.' Thus, the major
ways in which the legislated rules of corporate law are said to facilitate the
operation of business enterprises are the following.

Separate Legal Entity
Section 15 of th e Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) provides the corporation with a separate legal personality that is. autonomous from those who
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own it (shareholders) and those who run it (directors). Corporate law thus
creates a new category of legal 'person'. Its personhood enables the corporation to ·act', in legal terms, independently of those who own and/or run it. It
can have legal relationships with ·outsiders ·to the corporation, such as creditors, suppl i ers, customers, and clients, as well as With its own shareholders and
directors. Its individual personhood allows it to make contracts, to sue and be
sued, and to have rights.
One strand of feminist theorizing would focus on how this emphasis on
carving out spaces and categories of separation and autonomy, which is played
out in liberal philosophy and scientific discourse as much as it is in corporate
law, is associated with masculinity and valued on that basis, while femininity
is associated with the connectedness and altruism that allows the (male)
autonomy to exist (England, 1993: 40). More specifically, Hall (1995: 173)
argues that the separate legal entity doctrine 'operates to split both the involvement and responsibility of directors from the acts and relations of a corporation. It starts with the assumption that directors . . . are not primarily
responsible for the acts they undertake on behalf of or as a corporation.' This
feminist theme that the norms of corporate law operate to d isplace responsibility for the consequences of action from wh ere it 'rightly ' belongs, in this
case with the directors, is one th at will recur when we look at the other fundamental contribution of corporate law to the organization of a corporation, that
of limited liability for shareholders.

Specialization and Hierarchy
Corporate statutes establish specific roles to be played by actors within the
corporation. These legally established roles are then allocated different rights
and responsibilities. The most significant roles are those of shareholder, director, and officer (CBCA, ss. 24, 102, 121). Corporate law thus establishes one type
of legal distinction between the identity of 'owner ' and that of 'worker' in a
business enterprise. Shareholders make the investment of capital that , pooled
together, allows the enterprise to function (Ireland et al, 1987). Should the
enterprise make a profit, shareholders will likely see the market value of their
shares increase and possibly get paid dividends on those shares. Many corporations contain a number of 'classes' of share ownership, each of which
bestows a set of corporate 'rights' on the holder. The most significant distinction
among classes of shareholders has to do with whether the shares are assigned
voting rights at shareholder meetings. Holders of voting shares are considered
to 'control' the corporation in the sense that they are the shareholders who elect
the board of directors and also make a number of significant corporate decisions
requiring their approval (CBCA, ss. 24, 173, 183). As shareholders, they have no
particu lar obligations to the firm and, indeed, remedies are available to them if
actions taken by the company or its directors are not in their best interests.
Discussion of some of these remedies, including the inaptly named 'oppression'
remedy, will form a significant part of the second half of this chapter.
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On the other hand, directors are elected by shareholders to run the company
on their behalf. Their legal responsibilities are not particularly clearly specified
in the corporate statutes, beyond an admonition to take some care in running
the corporation and to act in its 'best interests', a formulation known in corporate law as the fiduciary duty, or the duty to be loyal (CBCA s.122). Mu ch
debate has surrounded the question of whether these statutory responsibilities
mean that they have to act in the best interests of the shareholder-owners only,
or that they can ta ke into account the interests of constituencies other than
shareholders, such as workers, consumers, the environment, and so on .3
Of ficers are full-time employees who are appointed by the board of directors to
run the company, ostensibly \Vith oversight by directors. The reality in small
corporations such as family businesses, however, is that all these legal roles
actually may be filled by the same people, a fact that makes the accountability
devices of voting and requiring loyalty, established by the corporate legal rules,
somewhat redundant.
From an economic point of vie\v the establishment of legally distinct roles
within the corporate structure is justified by the virtues of specialization and
comparative advantage. As Easterbrook and Fischel (1991: 11) put it:
The separation of risk-bearing [via investment] from employment is a form of
the division of labor. Those who have wealth can employ it productively even
if they are not good managers; those who can manage but lack wealth can hire
capital in the market; and the ex.istence of claims that can be traded separately
from employment allO\VS investors to diversify their investment Interests. . . .
Investors bear most of the risk of busi ness failure, in exchange for which they
are promised most of the rewards of success.
Further, as Cheffins (1997: 34) points out, 'The hierarchical organization of a
firm offers another important advantage which is that joint production can be
organized on a more effective basis.'
A feminist perspective would counter, at the most obvious level, with the
empirical observation that despite the fact that these legally established
categories are formally gender- neutral, comparatively few women perform
these roles. One of the difficulties with drawing conclusions here is that the
actual extent of women's shareholding i n corpora tions whose shares do not
trade on public 1narkets (i.e., most family-run corporations) is hard to conclusively establish. But case law dealing with family businesses tends to reveal
anecdotally that if women are shareholders, the classification of shares they
hold are the non-voting shares. In other words, while they may be owners, they
do not necessarily share control ( The Queen v. Mcclurg 1990; Re Ferguson,
1983). This makes Davidoff and Hall's (1987: 277) historical point tha t 'It was
primarily women who were the beneficiaries of "passive· property yielding
income only: trusts, annuities, subscriptions and insurance' of continued
contemporary relevance. On the other hand, with respct to the larger, publicly
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traded corporations, one of the recurring liberal feminist cnuc1sms of the
corpor ate sector in Canada has been the paucity of women directors. At the
moment 9 per cent of public Canadian corporations have women directors
(Carlyle, 1995).
At another level, feminists would be attent.ive to the fact that these legally
established categories of shareholder, director, and manager have the effect of
assign.ing power, control, and inequality in specific ways. Hierarchical organizations, both commercial and non-commercial, have long been subjected to a
feminist critique for their tendency, not only to exclude women in the interests
of particular versions of 'social cohesion', but to express masculine values
(Ferguson, 1984; Elson, 1994: 39-40; Gabaldon, 1992: 1429). Even more significantly, it is necessary to be attentive to what happens once women come to
play these roles in particular corporate hierarchies. Although the empirical
evidence we will later consider deals only with one corporate sector, the family
business, one of the important research findings in this respect is that women
owners or decision-makers in these enterprises do not necessarily exercise the
power or control the legally defined categories of shareholder or director
accord them. Understanding why this is so is crucial to our ability to draw
conclusions about the role of corporate law in reproducing gendered social and
material relations in the context of the family business .

Limited Liability
It has been noted that the allocation of specific legal risks and liabilities is

closely connected to the creation of specific corporate roles. The establishment
of limited liability for corporate shareholders (CBCA, s. 45) is of ten seen as the
fundamenta l feature of corporate Jaw. This principle m eans that, generally
speaking. shareholders are not personally liable for any debts incurred by the
corporation that it is unable to pay. All that a shareholder stands to lose in
making a corporate investment is the value of the investment that she or he
has contributed. This occurs despite the fact that the shareholder, dependi ng
on the number of shares held or other roles performed, may be in a position to
cause the corporation to incur the debt in the first place. Nor, as a matter of
corporate law, are directors usually personally liable for the debts of a corporation, either, although a number of recent statutes will assign specific responsibilities to directors, such as in the environmental law area. But directors can
be sued by the corporation, or its sh areholders, for f ailure to abide by their
duty of loyalty to the corporat ion.
Law and economics scholars have an elaborate set of justif ications for the
doctrine of limited liability (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Chef tins, 1997;
Gabaldon, 1992). Among the most popular arguments from this perspective are
that the rule allows investors to diversify their risk and so promotes further
investment, since they know in advance ho\v much risk they bear in investing
in a corporation (that is, they know the maximum they can lose). The rule also
allows the stock market to value shares appropriately, since it does not have to
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take into account.. in assigning values to shares, the wealth of , and likelihood
of recovery from, individual shareholders. This enables t he stock market to
work efficien tly. Furthermore, limited liability reduces the need to mon itor or
oversee the decision-makers in the f irm (assuming t he owners are not
themselves the decision-makers), because t he shareh older's exposu re to risk is
not u nlimited . The apparent problem \11Jith moni tori ng is that, first, ii is costly,
especially i n large corporations \Vith many sharehold ers, and, second, shareholders with only an insignificant holding ha ve no incentive to engage in
m onitoring that would benefit shareholders generally (the 'free rider '
problem). In th is sense, allocations constit ut ed by the limi ted liability doctrine
privilege the interests of shareholders over those creditors who lend the
con1pany 1noney, or w ho supply it with goods, but do not thereby obtain an
ownership interest. In response, law and economists argue t hat limited lia billty act ually equalizes the position of shareholders and creditors since both
groups stand to lose only w hat they invest. Shareholders, of course, stand to
gain more than creditors should the corporation turn a profit.
As we can see, these justifications revolve around ideas of promoting
efficiency generally, and more specifically, of sh ifting risk to where it is most
efficiently borne. Theresa Gabaldon has engaged in an extended critique of the
law and economics just i fications for limited liability f rom a feminist perspective. She points out th at wh ile t h e economic analysis of limi ted liability
'permits particular actors . . . to calibrate the economic gan1bles that they are
\"lilling to take' on the basis of a profit/loss calculation, it does not 'address the
responsibility-culpability characterization'. She argues th at 'liability limitations
artificially distance individuals fro1n the real-life effects o{ the enterprise in
which they i nvest, thus decreasing their ackno\v)edged personal responsibility.'
She further asserts that the 'key difference between economic and feminist
reasoning on this point is . . . the fem inist belief that int erest in m onitori ng is
a social good, rathe r than a duplicative waste' (Gabaldon, 1992: 1424). This
argument presumably cannot be taken to the somewhat essentialist length of
saying that i{ wome n ran corporations, they would be more likely to accept
personal responsibility for their act ions. It is rather to acknowledge that the
legal rule on limited liability constitutes understanding s of the appropriateness
of risk displacement and the need for accountabi lity for corporate 'harms' in
particular ways, which may, at least in part, be related to the interests of those
with superior econo1nic power within the corporate enterprise. For a pa rticular
strand of feminist analysis, participation and accountability are va lu ed in and
of themselves, irrespective of \vhether they contribute t o the efficient operat ion
of a corporate enterprise.
Finall y, it should be pointed out that law and econornists are generally more
sanguine than are femi nists about th e possibility of unlimited liability for
shareholders in the case of small corporations. This is because in those
contexts, the connection between th e capacity of the shareholder to control the
corporation and i ts ultin1.a te actions is a closer one. This posi tion, of course, is
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based on an assumption about shareholder control that would benefit from
being supported by empirical investigation, particularly wh ere women fill
those shareholding roles in family businesses.

Profit Maximization
While profit maximization is not unique to the corporate for1n of business
enterprise, there are various ways in which the norms of corporate law lend
particular support to this goal. For example, the judicial interpretation of the
fiduciary duty of directors to act in the best interests of the corporation has
emphasized the interests of shareholders in corporate profit maximization at
the expense of attempts by corporations to engage in 'socially responsible'
behaviour (Dodge, 1919; Parke, 1962; Varity ; Teck , 1972; Tolmie, 1992).This is
why corporations that attempt to be socially responsible usually use as a justification the fact that such behaviour is in the shareholders' interests. Another
example of corporate law support for the goal of profit-making is the rule with
respect to shareholder proposals, which is th at shareholders can only request
the corporation to act, or refrain from acting, in order to achieve the economic
interests of the corporation as opposed to other, more 'social' interests (CBCA,
s. 137).
The singularity of this goal of corporate enterprise is justified by economic
theory at a number of levels. At one level, the rational actor who is the core of
economic theorizing is assumed always to act in his or her self-interest so as
to maximize his or her 'utility'. An econon1ic system, and the legal rules that
support that system, must seek to allow individuals to pursue their particular
self-interest in the course of their interactions with others, since to do otherwise would be to impose a particular set of preferences on them. As England
(1993: 45) points out, although self-interest need not in1ply selfishness, or
specifically in the context of corporations, profit maximization, 'in practice,
most economists do assume selfishness in markets."l England sees chis as
flowing from the 'separative model of self', wh ich is at the core of economic
reasoning. With respect t o the fiduciary duty of directors in th e corporate law
context, however, loyalty (often considered antithetical to selfishness) to the
corporation is expected, but this loyalty is requjred to be exercised in the interests of profit-making for shareholders . At another level, economists argue
simply that a singular goal is more efficiently accomplished than a multifaceted
one. Furthermore, it is argued to be undemocratic to require or expect
unelected directors of corporations to achieve socially responsible or distributive outcomes by their decision-making.
In assessing whether this focus on self-interest and profit maximization is a
gendered one, scholars such as Folbre and Hartma nn (1988: 193, 195, 197)
caution against a potential feminist response that women 'are not as economically rational or self-interested as men'. They characterize the argument that
'women altruistically choose' to put the interests and well-being of others, such
as famil y members, ahead of their own economic interests as 'ideological'.5
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They argue that a more fruitf ul approach would be to bring 'the traditional
boundaries between self-interest and altruis1n into question' and to 'develop a
more complete theory of economic interests, one that can encompass concepts
like cooperation, loyalty, and reciprocity'. A family business is, of course, an
important place to see a multilayered economic rationality at work . Anderson's
work (1993: 34-5) contains an example that nicely illustrates, in a business
context, this effort to develop an expanded understanding of economic rationality. She describes the couple who 'struggle for years to . . . establish a
family restaurant' and who are offered a buy-out from a franchise operation.
She argues that 'A concern for the narrative unity of their lives, for what
meaning their present choices make of their past actions, could rationally
motivate them to turn down the offer.'6 In other words, despite presumed financial benefits to be gained from selling out, an expanded definition of economic
rationality would instead result in a continued commitment to, and satisfaction
with, an enterprise to which they had devoted a significant part of their lives.
Fehlberg's study of women involved in family businesses, discussed in more
detail below, found that 'involvement in the family business reflected "the
often passionate belief that marriage and business were intimately intertwined'" (1997: 14).
To summarize, then, an attempt has been made to articulate the ways in
which corporate Jaw may operate at a symbolic level to 'engender' the corporate form, by privileging valu es of efficiency over accountability, hierarchy over
inclusiveness, risk displacement over responsibility, and profit-making over
social responsibility. But it is importa nt to investigate empiricall y the extent to
which, and how, this discursive framework of corporate law actually structures
practices within the family firm. It is a truism of socio-legal scholarship that
the 'fit' between the 'law in the books' and the 'law in action' is not usually a
complete or smooth one. It is to this issue that we now turn.

Women, Corporate Law, and Family Businesses:
Some Empirical Evidence
I have noted that the family business provides one empirical entry point into
the question of the opportunities for, and characteristics of, women's involve·
ment in business enterprises as owners or directors. Research into how the
participation of women in this realm is structured is relatively new, but still a
few trend s may be observed. Again, there has been little empirical considera tion to date, especially in Canada, of how the role of women in family
businesses has been mediated by law, though a number of Australian feminists
recently have embarked on such a project. The goal is to use this empirical
evidence to assess the power of corporate law in 'gendering' the participation
of women in these enterprises.
The first two of the followi ng empirical studies described did not. in fact,
have the role of law as a primary focus. ln an English study titled 'Entrepre-

190 Law as a Gender ing Practice

neurship, Ethnicity, and Gender', Phizacklea (1988) examines the contemporary relationship among class, gender, and race in the context of the family
firm. In answer to the question, 'Do members of a family firm share an identical class situation or not ?' she responds in the negative. Her study of the operation of the clothing industry in the West Midlands demonstrated that 'All
female members and young male members of the family are working under
patriarchal relations of production, they remain dependent for their maintenance on the 'boss' who is usually also the head of the household, in return
for their efforts' (Phizacklea, 1988: 31). She concludes that while it has been
well documented that 'access to "iamily" or community 1nembers as low-wage
workers is a key competitive advantage for many ethnic businessmen '. what
has been less evident is 'the extent to which this "family" and "community "
labour is female and subord inated to very similar pa triarchal cqntrol mecha·
nisms in the workplace as in the h ome.' 7
In a 1991 groundbreaking study conducted for the Canadian Advisory
Council on the Status of Women, Belcourt et al . investigated the 'struggles,
challenges and achievements' of more than 200 women business owners across
Canada. One of the main purposes of the study was to 'consider how public
policy might facilitate the work of female entrepreneurs and thus help to
harness the economic benefits of this form of business development' (Belcourt
et al., 1991: 1). In a telling example of the absence of corporate l aw as a
variable studied, it is not completely clear that the businesses surveyed were
in fact incorporated, although the study contains a table (ibid ., 11) entitled
'company start up', indicating that 60 per cent of the women surveyed founded
their businesses themselves, 29 per cent bought them, and 5 per cent inherited
them.8 The overall conclusion of the study was tha.t in addition to the usual
difficulties facing all entrepreneurs in making a success of a new business
venture, 'a woman entrepreneur faces conditions that appear to be attributable
almost completely to the fact that she is a woman in a non-traditional occupation. . . . Surrounded by opportunities but hemmed in by circumstances, the
won1an entrepreneur sees her ability to realize business and personal success
limited by a number of obstacles' (ibid., 65).
In proceeding to identif y those obstacles, the study enumerates issues such
as: discrimina tion,9 clustering in business sectors with low financial pay-off,
limited relevant work experience or 1nanagement training, shortage of peer
support networks or an inability to make use of them because of being
'overloaded with business and family responsibilities' (ibid., 67) and insuf ficient financial return. Included in the list of obstacles were those of the
'conflicting dema nds of managing a business, a home and children' and 'no
operational support from husbands'. With respect to the former, the study
notes that 'the double shift is standard'. with most of the women entrepreneurs
they studied, unlike men entrepreneurs, assuming 'complete responsibility for
home and children'. With respect to the latter, few of the study's respondents
'were able to rely on their husbands for anything but token help'. The help
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given by husbands was characterized as 'one-shot ', but 'nothing close to the
continuing responsibility taken on by many wives of male small business
owners'. Significantly, Belcourt et al. conclude that 'although some have
broken new ground in the business world, thus far they have not renegotiated
th e traditional division of family and household tasks' (ibid., 69-70). Thus,
while this study did not set out to examine the effects of corporate law rules
on women's experience of entrepreneurship, what is striking about its conclusions, as well as those of the Phi zacklea study, is that the most influential
practices in the gendering of entrepreneurship have to do with th e intractability of the traditional familial roles played by women rather than being attributable to what business law rules 'allowed' or required women to do. This
suggests that corporate law's gendering role may be less signif icant than that
of traditional family organization or familial divisions of labour.
Australia has been a more fertile location for feminist legal consideration of
the role of women in family businesses. For example, Dodds Streeton (1994)
examines the liability of women as company directors or guarantors for the
debts of their spouses or the companies of which they are directors, in a
process now widely characterized as 'sexually transmitted debt' (Fehlberg,
1994: 475). She argues that women directors became liable for company debts
because they 'share the hallmarks' of a surety, who guarantees the debt. Yet,
'Although formally appointed as directors, these won1en will often have little
opportunity for actual involvement or input into the business because of their
'traditional' role in the patriarchical family and their exclusion from matters of
business' (Hall, 1995: 175). Dodds Streeton (1994: 16) ultimately concludes :
The fundamental problem of women's vulnerable position in personal and
family relationships with men, and their relative exclusion from commercial
experience and control cannot be solved by law. . . . If the law attempted to
address the pro blem of the pervasive vu lnerability of women as a group by
absolutely precludi ng creditors from access to their assets, it would effectively
destroy their legal capacity, restrict their access to credit, and totally undercut
the achievemen t of equal and independent status.
In similar vein, Fehlberg describes t\vo studies of women's involvement in
family businesses, one conducted in Australia by Singh (1995) and the other
conducted by Fehlberg herself in England (1997). These studies found that
although the women surveyed tended to be very 'involved' in the family
business on a day-to-day basis, they were 'likely to vie\v themselves as less
powerful t han their husband or de facto partner in the family business context'
(Fehlberg, 1997: 2). Interestingly, one of the findings of the Fehlberg study was
that women who described themselves as havi ng no role in the family business
often held the legal positions of corupany director, company secretary (officer),
or shareholder. Yet, 'they had never considered exerting their formal legal
rights as directors or shareholders in order to obtain a direct financial benef it
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from the business. Similarly, women who held shares invariably did not know
the extent of their shareholding' (ibid., 8). The Singh study contained one
example of 'Mrs. A not being " allowed" to see the books, even though she was
the company secretary, [which] indicates strongly the discrepancy between
formal legal rights and practical realities.' Fehlberg concludes that 'these
findings challenge the accuracy of contractual assu1nptions that lega l rights are
readily acted upon and tra nsla ted into practical benefits.' Furthermore, even
women who were involved in the 'financial operation· of the business had 'no
role in strategic decision-making' . a position Fehlberg characterizes as
'informed powerlessness'. Thus, 'the business emerges in these studies as
ultimately the province of the male decision-making authority. Women may be
very involved in family businesses without sharing the strategic decisionmaking power' (ibid., 15).
To what extent does this empirical material shed light on the feminist
critiques of corporate law doctrines described above? In the first place, it
suggests that the analysis of the doctrine of limited liability of shareholders as
being responsible for the passivity and non·inv olvement of shareholders in the
direction of corporate activity is incomplete. Rather, the picture that emerges
here is that women as owners or directors of family businesses continue to be
enmeshed in power inequalities that derive from the practices of traditional
family relations. As Grbich (1987: 329) puts it in the context of taxation laws.
'Positions for women appear never to be secured by rights to income or to
property so Jong as her position is part of familial rela tions.' Furtherm ore, we
have seen that one of Singh's findings was an 'often passionate belief that
marriage and bus iness were ultim ately intertwined' (Fehlberg. 1997: 14) ,
suggesting again that the formal legal charact erization of a con1pany as a
separated and independent actor has no particular resonance in the context of
family businesses.

From Oppression to Corporate Power?
The material discussed in the preceding section arguably suggests some limitations on our ability to impute a significant power to corporate law to accomplish unaided the 'gendering' of family businesses. Another striking feature of
the picture painted by this empirical material is that, while the extent of corporate law 's contribution is arguably unclear, women appear vulnerable in the
family business or entrepreneurial context, victims of their lack of commercial
experience or their position in the family. But a rather contradictory impression
emerges if we consider some exan1ples of the use by women shareholders of
the shareholder remedies provided for in various provincial corporate statutes
and the Canada Business Corporat ions Act. The most controversial remedy is
that known as the oppression remedy, which allo\vs shareholders and other
'complainants' to seek a judicial remedy if their interests have been 'oppressed'
or uniairly prejudiced by actions taken by the corporation or its directors.
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Another is tbe wi nding-up remedy \Vhich allows a court to order a company to
be wound up or liquidated, and its assets dispersed to shareh old ers, if a shareholder has legal grounds for such a request. An interesting feature of the cases
considered below is precisely the use of these remedies in the con text of family
dissolution, a situation where women's econon1i c interests are considered by
family lawyers to be particularly vulnerable.
One of th e best -known Canadian shareholder oppression cases is Ferguson v.
J max.10 H ere the mobil i za tion of th e corporate law remedy had the effect of
allowing the complainant shareholder to achieve recognitio n for her contribu·
tion to the business enterprise and to remain a shareholder despite significan t
opposition f rom another po\verf ul sh areholder, her ex-husba nd. The case
invol ved a business (Imax)
owned by three heterosexual couples, the
Fergusons and two others, both of ivhich couples were previous associa tes or
friends of Mr Ferguson . All th ree women involved held n on-voting preference
shares, w hereas the men held voting shares (meaning, as we have seen, that
they had con trol of the decision-n1aking). Only Ms Ferguson, of the lhree
women, activ ely participated in the company. The Ontario Court of Appeal
found that 'she worked hard in the compa ny's interest and was ooe of its
founders together with the three men.' In fact, the three men 'were each
employed in other endeavours and could not devote their full t ime to the
co1npany.' In 1974, Ms Ferguson divorced her h usband on the grounds of his
infidelity. The issu e vve are interested in revolved around her conten tion, which
was accepted by the cou rt, that from the time of the divorce Mr Ferguson did
his uunost to squeeze her out of her shareholding in the company. He first tried
to prevent t he declaration of di vidends to the class of shares that she owned
and ultimately used corpor ate proced ural devices to attemp t to pass a resolu·
lion that would have had t he effect of forcing redemption (repu rchase) by th e
compa ny of h er class of shares. thereby elimi nating her i nvol.vem ent as a
shareholder. Ms Ferguson was pressured by other shareholders to sell her
shares because, according to them, her former husban d wou ld n ot coun tenance the declara tion of dividends while she would share equ ally in them.
Th e court held th at the conduct of lvtr Ferguson on behalf of th e compa ny
was oppressive. Thus (p. 135) , 'I am satisfied that wh at she says is true. The
company could pay dividends. Mr. Ferguson set out to stop the payment
because he did not \Vant Mrs. Ferguson to share in the benefit s in t he grov.rtb
of the company and wanted to force her to sell her shares to hi m or to one of
the other n1en in the company. . . . In my opinion this condu ct was oppressive
and unfai r to h er.' Significantly, the court concl uded that w hen d ealing with a
'close' corporation (a sn1all company with few sharehol ders) , th e court 'may
consider the relationship between ihe shareholders and not si mply legal rights
as such' (emphasis added). Even though evidence was provided that there
were economic advantages to the corporation of doing the reorganization of
the share classes, the con duct was oppressive because th e 'reasons that
motivated management' were unfair. In rather disturbing l anguage, the Court
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of Appeal characterized the attempt to pass th e corporate resolution to redeem
Ms Ferguson's shares as ·a final solution to the problem of the ex-wife shareholder'. On the basis of the evidence, the court was unwilling to accept that the
company had a valid business purpose in attempting to squeeze her out. She
was thus able to mobilize to her advantage norms of corporate law requiring
directors to have valid business reasons for their actions on behalf of corporations. In view of our earlier discussion about the need articulated by feminists
for a broader conception of economic interests, it is also significant that Ms
Ferguson's interest in this company, as recognized by the court, was one that
came out of her loyalty to and history of participation in it. The result
ultimately allowed her a continued interest in the company's affairs and
prosperity rather tl1an resorlirlg to the family law approach of dividi ng of
property and severing t ies.
Another example of the strategic use of corporate law by women shareholders comes from the more recent M. v. H.11 case. Here a lesbian couple were
separating. One of the couple applied for interim support from the other under
the Family Law Act, which was denied on the ground that she did not come
wi th.i n the definition of 'spouse' in the Family Law Act. She also claimed
interim relief from oppression un der s. 248 of the Ontario Business
Corporations Act. She made this claim because of the alleged oppressive
actions of her former partner with respect to the company of which they were
both SO per cent shareholders. The latter began operating the company as
though she were the sole owner. The plaintiff was refused access to the
company's books and her signature was imitated (with her knowledge) on
cheques that required joint signatures. Epstein J. concluded (p. 100) that 'lhe
evidence here strongly supports a conclusion tha t the defendant, particularly
in excluding the plaintif f from any meaningful pa rticipation in [the company]
during the past S years and then closing the business down after the parties
separated, was in violation of the plainti ff's expectations that could be said to
have been (or ought to be considered as) part of their comp act as shareholders'
(emphasis added). The court therefore used the plaintiff's expectations as a
shareholder to establish a standard of corporate conduct to which the defendant was expected to adhere. Significantly, the court ordered money to be
released from a corporate account to the plaintiff by way of a loan, to be noninterest-bearing, and to be available to the plaintiff until the ultimate resolution of this action. Thus the judg e award ed her support under corporate law
rat her than fan1ily Ja w principles. The norms governing relations among shareholders in a small business were ultimately more effective for the lesbian pl aintiff, in the context of relationship dissolut ion, than those acceptable within a
family law context.
Finally, Belman v. Belman 12 is particularly interesting for the insight i t
affords into the dif fering legal implications of behaviour depending on whether
the context is marital or corporate. The case dealt with a claim for division of
assets following divorce. The judg e's treatment of this claim explicitly
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separated the 'family l aw' issue from the 'corporate law' issue. The first of
these involved a claim by the former •vife for a payn1ent of $250,000 over and
above the equal division of the spouses' property on the basis of her 'extraordinary contribution to the marriage' (p. 64). The husband had agreed to this
in 1990 'after much discussion', bu t withd rew his agreement on hearing about
an alleged affair between his wife and one of her business associates. This was
consistently denied by the w ife, though the court found that the husband had
a 'sincere belief that it \Vas tru e'. Because the wife's claim to the $250,000 was
based by her on 'a moral obligation that arose out of her extraordinary contributions to their marriage', the court concluded that the 'alleged af fair was
relevant to that rationale' (p. 68). Further, Spence J. considered that he 'would
have difficul ty concluding that Mr. Belman 's reaction was unreasonable'. Mr
Belman was therefore released from the obligation lo pay the money to his
former wife.
However, what was considered a reasonable reaction in the context of
marit al obligations was regarded otherw ise in the corporate context. The
corporate law issue arose from a claim by Ms Belm an for a transfer to her of
her former husband 's SO per cent ownership in the corporation. This claim was
made on the grounds that there was a 'loss of mutua l confidence' bet\veen the
two owners such that t he business could no longer be conducted effectively. In
response to this, the husba nd claimed that he had not lost confidence in his
former wife (having forgiven her for her alleged conduct), so that the grounds
for a mandatory transfer of his shares were not present. In his consideration of
this issue, the judg e again relied on the response of the husband to the information he received about his wife's alleged affair. Mr Belman's denunciation
of his wife follo\ving his accusation about the affair, and his statement that 'he
did not wish to see her again or to continue to work with her· (p. 78) meant
that her l oss of confidence in their ability to carry on together in t he business
·was entirely appropriate' and could not be said to be 'arbitra ry or u nreasonable'. Mr Belman had requested that the court consid er his wife's concerns
about continuing to work wi th hi m as a business partner as being 'exaggerated
or without foundation '. Significantly, Spence J. concluded that this was 'in
effect an invitation to the court to substitute its business judgm ent for that of
Ms. Belman and should accordingly be treated \Vith the greatest caution' (p.
79). The result of this, therefore, was that Ms Belman's business judgment was
deferred to by the court even though her interpretation of her 'moral obligations' was not. The privilege that courts tend to a\vard to the business
judgment of directors in running corporations as they see fit prevented the
former husband in this situation from being able to characterize his wife's wish
to dissociate him from the business as exaggerated and unreasonable.
As we have seen, the remedy sought by Ms Belman was an order that would
direct the transfer to her of Mr Belman 's shares for fair market value. The latter
wanted, instead, a court-ordered shareholders' agreement relating to the direction and man agement of the business, which wou ld allow him to remai n a

196 Law as a Genderi ng Practice
shareholder in the business. In choosing between these two proposals, Spence
J. favoured that of the wife, ordering a mandatory transfer of lvlr Belman's
interest in the company to her at fair market val ue. The demands of running a
business effectively, it seems, preclude any tolerance for ongoing disputes and
loss of confidence in a partner's business acumen.
The significance of these cases is only partly that they show, in contrast to
the Australian material referred to earlier, how women in family -run enterprises can use corporate law principles to their advantage.13 Even more important is a specification of the corporate law logic that proves compel ling in these
cases.This logic has to do with a privileging of j udgment s abou t how to run a
business effectively and requirements for 'valid business purposes' in making
decisions, as well as for demonstrations of loyalty to a company. It seems that
as Jong as they formulate their claims in terms of these corporate logics, plaintiffs in cases such as M. v. H. or Belnian may escape the potentially negative
effects of h ow family law norms reinforce prevailing understandings of 'appropriate' family relationships .

Conclusion
It may well be premature to draw conclusions on the basis of such preliminary

data. But the data so far suggest that there is no easy answer to the question
of the extent to which corporate law is complicit in. or furthers, the oppression
of that class of women who are business owners or managers. The answer
depends in part on a close consideration of the relationship between the role
of corporate law as discourse and its importance in structuring actual business
practices. While the discourses of corporate law may have general social effects
in privileging particular sets of values, it is crucial to develop a nuanced understanding of how these discourses actually operate in a variety of contexts.
Further, it is arguable that corporate law is not solely responsible for bringing
into being gend ered subject positions withi n family firms. It is clear that those
women who seek to use corporate law to their material advant age a.re required
to formulate their claims in terms of particular argumen ts about loyalty to a
corporation and the efficient running of business enterprises in order to be
successful, as they sometimes are, But it is also arguable that the gendering of
women's role in the family firm by corporate law cannot be u nderstood in
isolation from the fan1ily relationships and familial practices in which those
women are implicated. If, in fact, women do not routinely exercise the
economic power the legal categories of corporate law give them, the reason for
this may have to do with the gendering practices of these traditional family
relations and, particularly, the family law that supports those practices. In this
sense the gendering effects of corporate Jaw and family law may i n fact be
contradictory or at odds with each other. This suggests th at, in order to draw
conclusions about the importance of law as a gendering strategy, it is necessary to be sensitive to the ways in which different discourses of law, such as
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those produced by family law and corporate law, interact with each other to
produce gendered subjects and material consequences, and to appreciate that
different arenas of law may support a multiplicity of outcomes for women.
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l. It should be noted that 'family business' is a term of art; there is no specific
legal definition of this concept.
2. In this paper, the terms 'corporation' and 'company' are used interchangeably.
3. Of course, directors are supposed to abide by all regulatory requirements
with respect to consumer and environmental legislation.
4. See also Cheffins·s contention (l 997: 156) th at ·rh e mainsprings of capitalism tend to derive from what many think of as baser hu man motives, such
as self-interest and the desire for personal profit.'
5. See the feminist literature (Waring, 1990; Boyd, 1997) on how business
profit- making is subsidized by \von1en's unpaid labour.
6. Interestingly, Anderson does not tell us v;hether either or both of this fictitious couple was a woman, or whether there was any dispute between
them about what decision to make!
7. The 1nediating effect of race on the gendered nature of participation in
family businesses is an extremely significant issue in the Canadian context,
raising as it does the further question of the role of law in that process.
Unfortunately, these intersections cannot be pursued here.
8. The complication here is that another 'ownership' table in the study
indicates that some women owned their business in conjunction with
'major' or 'minor' partners (partnership being a separate form of business
enterprise) . The authors also quote a 1988 study by Lavoie that appears to
indicate that the choice of the legal form of a business enterprise (e.g., a
sole prop rietorship or a corporation) is itself gendered. Thus, 'Lavoie noted
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the tendency of women to operate their businesses as sole proprietors hips,
although she observed that women in traditionally male sectors tended to
follow the organizational structure preferred by men owners (incorporation) ' (Belcourt et al., 1991: 12).
9. This included differential treatment by creditors, suppliers, customers, and
even employees. It seemed th at 'being married and having children
contributes to the perception of stability in male applicants, but these same
factors are taken to suggest unreliability in women applicants' (Belcourt et
al, 1991: 66).
10. Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp. (1983) 43 O.R. (2d) 128 (Ont. C.A.).
11. M. v. H. (1993)

so R.F.L. (3d) 92 (Ont. Ct., Gen. Div.).

12. Bel1nan v. Belman (1995) 26 O.R. {3d) 56 (Ont. Ct., Gen. Div.).
13. It should be recognized that the ability to advance these corporate law
remedies may largely be a function of the legal advice obtained by the
plaintiffs.

